An asset allocation recommendation depends on the market forecasts and the individual characteristics of the investor. The existing scientific literature is focused on market forecasts, while the investor profile is shortly depicted, usually resorting to a hypothetical one, for instance identified by adjectives such as conservative, moderate, aggressive. On the contrary, we take a richer picture of the investor profile, because we think that only a tailor made advice can really add value for the clients. Our dataset is composed by 420 advice, issued by 135 money managers and professionals during a 5 years period, from 1998 to 2003, in the most important Italian financial newspaper (Il Sole 24 Ore) for the benefit of individual investors who had written the newspaper's editorial office giving a rich description of their personal profile. About 30% of the advisors are not Italian ones working for international securities brokers and investment banks. Our study contributes to understand how advisors transfer the investor's characteristics into the investment process. Even though we found some results contradicting the well known normative models, such as the CAPM, we think that many properties of the asset allocation proposals are consistent with the purpose to issue tailor made advice which are not too far from optimizing targets. Some drawbacks come out as well: for instance the importance of the investor's borrowing is overlooked. Moreover the relationship between home bias, that is the overweight of the domestic stocks, and the investor's profile looks inconsistent with the principle of acting as professionals who try to reconcile the normative rules, optimizing from a theoretical point of view, but unacceptable and not well understood by the client, with the behavior of individual investors.
Introduction
Since the remote study by Lease et al. (1974) , the recent literature has devoted many efforts in explaining the individual investor's behavior (De Bondt 1998; Odean 1998; Odean 1999; Barber and Odean 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Dorn and Huberman 2005; Polkovnicenko 2005) , while the work on the drivers of asset allocation recommendations of professional advisors is less developed.
An asset allocation recommendation depends on the market forecasts and the characteristics of the investors: the mean-variance model proposed by Markowitz (1952) is the simplest and best known way to afford this problem. Important studies (Canner et al. 1997; Elton and Gruber 2001) discuss portfolio advice in the light of mean variance framework trying to find out whether they are consistent with the normative model.
However, according to other researchers, a simple descriptive analysis of asset allocation advice is sufficient to point out that usually portfolio management is the result of a series of partial investment decisions, following a layered approach (Fisher and Statman 1997; Shefrin 2002: 119 -137) . First of all, advisors fix the portfolio's portion which must bear few risks, to satisfy the need of security that, even though in a variable degree, concerns almost all investors. The remaining wealth is invested in assets with a progressively higher risk-return profile. At the bottom of the ideal layered pyramid there are the safest securities: then there are bonds and, on a higher layer, stocks.
At the pinnacle of the pyramid the riskiest investments lie. The layered pyramid approach suggests that decisions about investment selection in each layer are independent, in contrast with classic portfolio theory which establishes an assessment of risk-return profile of portfolio as a whole. The theoretical reference point of this behavior is the Behavioral Portfolio Theory (BPT) by Shefrin and Statman (2000) , a descriptive theory in which investment decisions depend on: expected wealth, desire for safety and potential, aspiration levels and probabilities of achieving aspiration levels.
BPT takes into consideration the possibility to not assess portfolio as a whole, introducing in portfolio theory a mental accounts logic, derived from prospect theory by Kahneman and Tverksy (1979) , which clearly resembles the layered pyramid method. Siebenmorgen and Weber (2003) developed a behavioral model to link professionals asset allocation advice to three relevant aspects: expected return, pure risk and naïve diversification. The pure risk is calculated neglecting actual correlations among assets, that is taking all correlations to be 1: the naïve diversification emphasizes the idea that, while neglecting correlations, advisors want to diversify and they do it almost equally splitting the wealth among investment alternatives (Benartzi and Thaler 2001) .
The divergence between investment advice and classic portfolios models can be seen as a demonstration of sub-optimality of the money management process. At the same time, one could argue the mean-variance framework is not suitable to investors' actual behavior who would choose their portfolios according to a wider set of goals and constraints than just the mean and variance of expected return. So professionals, adopting a less rigorous approach in asset allocation, could propose more appealing portfolios maybe with a little loss in mean-variance efficiency.
In this paper we try to find out how do money managers and advisors perform the task to issue tailor made investment advice for individual investors. We are particularly interested in what are the individual investors' characteristics influencing the proposals of advisors: rather than restricting our analysis to the investor's attitude toward risk, as Canner et al. (1997) , we take a wider perspective. Even if it is quite easy to find public advice issued for hypothetical investors, usually identified by some adjectives such as "conservative", "moderate", "aggressive", the advisors correctly emphasize that tailor made advice are more useful for the investors. Financial advisors manage investors as well as investments: acting as investment advisors they should be able to beat the market or at least to lay on the efficient frontier. If they frame themselves as investor advisors they must examine carefully the financial resources, goals and constraints of the investors, as well as their cognitive limits and their financial education (Statman 1999) . There are thousands of professional advisors worldwide and we cannot accept the hypothesis that most of them can beat the market. So even if investors are willing to pay fees for the supposed ability to forecast future market returns, we must stress that there is more room for investor advisors than for investment advisors. As stated also by Benartzi and Thaler (2001) , most of times it is not so important if an investor lies on the efficient frontier (usually many proposals are not so far from it), but where he is on the efficient frontier: in other words, investor advisory (where one is on the efficient frontier) comes out to be more important than investment advisory (whether he is above, on or below the efficient frontier).
While existing literature is focused exclusively (Barber and Loeffler 1993; Graham and Harvey 1996; Jaffe and Mahoney 1999) or mainly (Canner et al. 1997; Fisher and Statman 1997; Elton and Gruber 2001) on the side of investment advisory, our paper contributes to understand the role and the behavior of investor advisory through the analysis of asset allocation proposals regularly issued by money managers and professionals in the most important Italian financial newspaper from 1998 up to 2003. Although based on advice published in an Italian newspaper, our study is not restricted to the Italian advisors, since about 30% of the advice are issued by non Italian advisors working for important securities brokers and investment banks. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous research affording in such a systematic way the issue of investor advisory. We claim we are dealing with a case of investor advisory because the proposals are directed to individual investors who wrote the newspaper giving a rich description of their personal profile. To tackle this issue we have measured the relation between the characteristics of the investor and some properties of the suggested portfolio.
We defined the framework describing the investor's profile through an approach that reflects the perspective of advisors, who usually distinguish between the risk preferences, regarded as a psychological construct, and the economic and social profile of the investor. More precisely, we identified the notions of risk tolerance and risk capacity (Roszkowski et al. 2005) , where the risk tolerance assesses how much risk an investor would like to take, while the risk capacity measures how much risk an investor can afford to take. While the first one is a psychological attribute, the latter one is a financial attribute and, since they are two potentially unrelated constraints, it is better to keep them separate. Even if the science of psychometrics has developed techniques to asses psychological constructs such as risk tolerance, the assessment of the risk capacity, since it depends more on observable variables (such as age, income and saving, wealth, job position, family composition) should be easier and less ambiguous.
With regard to the properties of the suggested asset allocation, first of all we identified the macro asset allocation, that is the allocation in cash, bonds and stocks. Our aim was to understand if advisors follow the CAPM separation theorem defining the risky portfolio (composed by bonds and stocks) independently from investors' characteristics and using the cash ratio to adjust the risk to the desired level. There are other works affording this issue (see for instance Kroll et al. 1988, Kroll and Levy 1992) , but they haven't been carried out on professional advisors. On the other hand, that ones concerning professional advisors either take a quite simplified picture of the investor (Canner et al. 1997) or are based on experiments run on a small and restricted sample of advisors (Siebenmorgen and Weber 2003) .
To understand how the general investment policy is developed, we ran a first regression based on the percentage invested in cash, that we call the cash ratio. We found that the cash ratio depends on several characteristics of the investor, even though that ones regarding the investor's family and its financial position have a stronger impact.
Then we focused on the annual standard deviation, taken as a proxy of risk, of the risky portfolio. We found the risk depends mainly on investor's risk tolerance while the other characteristics are less important. These results show that to afford a challenging task, such as building a tailor made asset allocation, advisors split their decisions. First of all they decide how much to invest in the safe asset, then they decide what risks to introduce in the risky portfolio.
These steps are at least partially separated, since they depends on different variables. The weight of the safe asset depends mainly on what we called risk capacity, while the risk of the risky portfolio depends only on what we called risk tolerance. The advisors follow what we could define a "reverse CAPM separation theorem": in fact, they use cash mainly to meet the needs and constraints of the investors and then they adjust to the desired risk level modifying the risky portfolio. These results confirm the soundness of our choice to introduce a clear distinction between risk tolerance and risk capacity.
Regardless how an asset allocation is built, one must anyway assess its overall risk profile.
So we replicated the previous analysis using as dependent variable the standard deviation of the overall portfolio. Our results clearly show that the risk tolerance is by far the most important factor explaining the whole risk of asset allocation recommendations, while the impact of risk capacity is weaker. While we will comment more in depth in the section 4 these results, here we briefly want to stress their main light and shade. On one hand, it is noteworthy the advisors' efforts to take into consideration the information the investors are giving them. On the other hand, some important variables are neglected: for instance, it is worrying that the investor's borrowing is not significant.
A borrowed investor is taking a short position on the riskless asset to increase his investment in risky assets: the advisor should take into consideration he is acting like the buyer of a financial future, therefore suggesting a less risky portfolio. More generally, we claim that, while the risk tolerance is in principle very important, it is in practice more difficult to asses than the risk capacity.
So advisors should balance more the relative weight of risk capacity and risk tolerance avoiding excessive emphasis on an unobservable variable.
The last general issue we afforded is what are the properties of the diversification among asset classes pursued by advisors. There are experimental studies demonstrating that investors overlook correlations (Kroll et al. 1988 ) and follow a naïve diversification behavior driven mainly by the heuristic of equally split the funds among asset classes (Benartzi and Thaler 2001, Siebenmorgen and Weber 2003) . Our work adds to these studies an empirical perspective and focuses on a wide set of advisors rather then on the private investors. Even though we can't demonstrate that advisors have been running the calculations implied by the proper theoretical use of the whole correlations set, we argue there is enough evidence that their diversification behavior is driven more by the actual correlations rather than by a simple naïve diversification heuristic.
At last, we examined the relation between home bias, that is the overweight of domestic stocks (French and Poterba 1991) , and the investor's profile. Home bias does not affect only the decisions of private investors (Coval and Moskowitz 1999) , but the investment advice from mutual fund companies as well, as found by Fisher and Statman (1997) analyzing the model portfolios proposed by those companies. It is not surprising that our dataset confirms the existence of home bias as well, even though it does not affect all money managers: only 37.41% of Italian advisors exhibit a clear home bias toward domestic market. This subset has been examined to find out what aspects of investor profile may explain the percentage of Italian stocks to total amount invested in stocks. We found a surprising result: the home bias is influenced by two risk capacity variables, the age and the annual income: in few words, older and low-income investors are the preferred targets of more home biased proposals. Advisors are probably aware that domestic markets are perceived more familiar (Huberman 2001) and therefore more predictable and less risky (Kilka and Weber 2000) . We conjecture that in our case the home bias is a way to induce the less confident investors, usually the older and the less educated ones (who are often also the low-income investors), to invest in the stock market. In such a case advisors would be rationally pursuing an irrational behavior which moves them away from one the stated principles of the investor advisory: helping investors to overcome their cognitive limits.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset, Section 3 introduces the empirical framework used in our analysis, Section 4 shows and comments the results, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data
The dataset is based on the investment advice published on Sunday in the page "L'esperto consiglia" (literally, "The expert advises") by "Il sole 24 ore", the most important Italian financial newspaper. Beginning in 9/27/1998, the page has been first published every two weeks: later, the frequency has increased and it has been published every week. The page is organized in the following way. Each time, the newspaper editorial office submits to a portfolio manager or to an executive of an investment firm (such as banks, mutual fund companies and other firms active in asset management) the profiles of two investors who have described the editorial office their social and economic situation.
With respect to the advisor, we know his/her identity, the investment firm employer and the wealth managed by the company. The advisor suggests a portfolio for each investor: nearly always, the proposal consists on a mix of mutual funds or similar products: he/she often suggests the funds managed by a specific investment firm, while sometimes indicates only the class: for instance, a fund specialized in European stocks, in emerging markets bonds and so on.
The portrait of the investor is quite rich. Summarizing, we know: age, family composition, job, annual income and savings, financial wealth, real estate properties (but not their value), the investor's borrowing (as long term mortgage loan), the investment horizon, goals and constraints, risk tolerance. Some summarizing statistics are reported in Table 1 and Table 2 1 .
Empirical framework
Our main research issue is to analyze which are the most important investors' characteristics driving the asset allocation advice. With this purpose, we run several regressions, using a rich set of variables. The dataset, described in section 2, is a panel composed by a sequence of observations, repeated through time, on a set of statistical units, the different advisors. The main advantage of this kind of dataset, over a classical cross sections or time series, is that it allows to study the behaviour of the advisors at the level of single unit, modelling differences across them. The heterogeneneity across units is in fact central in the analysis. This heterogeneity, also called individual effect, can be observed, such as the advisor's nationality for example, or unobserved, such as heterogeneity in skills, preferences or expectations. While the observed differences can be modelled by an ordinary linear model, the unobserved ones can not 2 .
To account for unobserved heterogeneity we can rely on two different approaches: the random effect and the fixed effect. The main difference between these two models is in the conceptualization and estimation of the individual effect. The choice of a fixed-versus a randomeffects model has some consequences: while the fixed effect estimator is always consistent, but inefficient, the random effect estimator is consistent and efficient if and only if its strong assumptions on which it relies on are true 3 . As in our dataset the test for the random effect does not support the consistency of this estimator we have run a fixed effect model that answers the question about the expected effect of a certain variable when this variable changes within a group. For this reason, the fixed-effects model, introducing a unit-specific intercept, allows to capture the unobserved heterogeneity, that is, the differences in the expected behaviour that can not be attribuited to the differences of the observed variables.
In practice, in a fixed-effects model, we are interested in the coefficients β and the constant of the expression below:
assuming that the u i are fixed quantities and allowing for different intercepts for our units, but constraining the slopes to be the same across units 4 .
The independent variables, supposed to be relevant and to affect the risk level of the proposal, are the same in all the regressions we run and they can be divided in the two general categories introduced by advisors (see the introduction): risk tolerance and risk capacity.
In our data risk tolerance is always defined by the investor itself, using one of these expression: low, medium -low; medium; medium-high; high. Because our aim is not to find the risk aversion according to the utility function approach, we categorized this variable assuming that the advisor processes this information following a proportionality rule: the high risk tolerance should correspond to five times more than the low one. Under this hypothesis, we transformed the 5 qualitative categories into a linear scale from 1 (corresponding to "low risk tolerance") to 5 ("high risk tolerance"). We tested also non proportional metrics, either less than proportional (using a logarithmic scale) or more than proportional (using an exponential scale), but the results were worse than the linear scale.
The picture of the risk capacity is multidimensional and much richer. The variables can be summarised in the following dimensions:
1. investor's features: age, job, investment horizon; 2. family composition: qualified either by the number of the family members (single vs couple) and by the number of children still living with the family;
3. economic and financial position: annual income, annual saving, financial wealth, homeownership, borrowing (typically as a long term mortgage loan).
Some of these data were easy to define, while the identification and classification of others have been more difficult because of their nature: some variables are neither metric nor ordinal. In order to ride out this problem for the statistical analysis, the most part of the qualitative data have been represented by dummy variables.
The investment horizon is often expressed in a non metric way. The following words can be found: short; medium -short; medium; medium -long; long. In this case, in order to reduce the issue of doubts and room for different interpretations, we followed the rule of not classifying data if they are not numerically specified, using only the quantitative time horizons clearly indicated in the papers. Splitting our dataset in two sub sets, according to whether the investment horizon was 3 The random effect basically needs: 1. a Gaussian distribution, 2. orthogonality to the included variables.
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The fixed-effects model is represented by the equation above, from which it follows: 2) employee (in the private or public sectors);
3) craftsman/professional/trader/farmer/entrepreneur (labelled as "independent job"); 4) fixed-term employee/risky job; 6 5) student/unemployed.
Finally, as regards the economic and financial conditions, we considered three quantitative variables and two qualitative variables (transformed in two dummies). The former ones are the annual saving, the annual income and the financial wealth (expressed in thousand euro), the latter ones are related to the eventual investor's mortgage loan (dummy equal to 0 if he hasn't got it, 1 otherwise) and if he owns the house where he is living or pays a rent (dummy equal to 0 if he pays a rent, 1 otherwise).
After some preliminary regressions we decided to drop the variables concerning the job position since they were always very far from being significant and we thought it was due to the difficulty of establishing a meaningful and concise classification of the several jobs listed in the pages. Rather than saying that the job is not taken into consideration by the advisors, we think it is a too multiform variable to be restricted into the typical simple classification suitable for a quantitative analysis.
In the following formula we summarize the predictors' structure of our regression models:
With regard to the dependent variable, we must take into consideration that the proposal consists on a mix of mutual funds or similar products: the advisor sometimes suggests the funds managed by a specific investment firm, while others he indicates only the class: for instance, a fund specialized in European stocks, in emerging markets bonds and so on. To calculate the risk That is the typical way to think about the fixed-effects estimator. 5 The fifth one is thereby defined. 6 We classified a job as a "risky job" when it is predictable a wage decrease.
of the proposal we fitted each fund as a set of market benchmarks: for instance, a sum invested in a balanced fund specialized in EMU markets has been split according to this rule: -50% invested in MSCI EMU index; -50% invested in JPM EMU aggregate all maturities.
If the fund had been a stock balanced fund the sum would have been split in this way: -75% invested in MSCI EMU index; -25% invested in JPM EMU aggregate all maturities index.
We used a set of many benchmarks to minimize the approximation implied by this approach: as shown in Table 3 , the benchmarks are 66, covering a wide range of possible asset classes among stocks, bonds and cash. Each month we calculated an updated variances and covariances matrix of daily returns in Italian lira (Euro): we used both last year and last three years returns, but in the results we reported only regressions with data based on last three years because their explanatory power was systematically higher (see Table 3 ).
Findings

The investment policy
The CAPM separation theorem states that if the investors can lend and borrow at the same risk free rate, then they must simply find the right mix of the risk free asset and the risky portfolio.
Therefore investors with different risk tolerance will hold different percentage of the risk free asset, while the risky portfolio will be always the same. In order to test the descriptive power of this theorem we ran two different regressions. In the first one the dependent variable was the cash ratio, that is the percentage invested in cash, here considered as the risk free asset. In the second one the dependent variable was the standard deviation of the risky portfolio, which excludes cash. If the advisors followed the CAPM separation theorem we would find that risk tolerance plays an important role in the first regression, while it is not significant in the second one.
We have split our dataset in two subsamples according to whether the investment horizon was elicited or not. When the investment horizon is clearly elicited by the investor, the F test of the model supports the fixed effect hypothesis, while when it is missing, the F test rejects it. This means that a complete specification of the investor's profile gets the advisor to a more systematic and clear heterogeneity, while the lack of that information brings him to a non-systematic individual effect.
In our opinion, these results are consistent with a relevance hypothesis of the investment horizon in the information set available to the advisor. The time horizon is one of the features of the investor's profile and not of the advisors. For this reason, when it is known, although not significant in our regression 7 , it does not influence the fixed-effect component of the regression 8 . However, if the advisor doesn't know explicitly the measure of this variable, using the other information given by the investor (for example his targets), he'll probably make some assumptions about it making some noise in the unobserved component, jeopardizing the model.
As shown in tables 5 and 6 our results are quite far from theoretical prescriptions. The cash ratio depends mainly on risk capacity variables, such as the family composition, the level of income and saving, while the coefficients of investor's features (age and risk tolerance) are only weakly significant. On the other hand, the standard deviation of risky portfolio, a part from a weak effect of family composition (number of children), is strongly influenced by the risk tolerance, moreover with an high explanatory power (R 2 is 0.53).
The overall portfolio risk
Whatever is the approach of advisors in building an asset allocation proposal, it is important to assess the consistency of its overall risk with the investor's characteristics. In this case cash is considered as a low risk, but not risk free, asset. The results of the regressions are reported in Table   7 . It is noteworthy the high explanatory power of the regression, meaning that advisors take actually into consideration the investors profile as represented in our analysis in their asset allocation proposals. Moreover the risk tolerance is by far the most important factor explaining the overall risk while only two other variables concerning risk capacity are clearly significant. The findings about the cash ratio and the risky portfolio allow us to better interpret this result: advisors use risk capacity variables to define some liquidity constraints and properties of their proposal. This stage influences the overall risk, but less than the following one where advisors decide the single asset classes according to the risk tolerance of investor. In our opinion, while the risk tolerance is in principle very important, it is in practice more difficult to asses than the risk capacity. So advisors should balance more the relative weight of the risk capacity and the risk tolerance avoiding excessive emphasis on an unobservable variable.
Discussion on the relationship between the investment process and the risk capacity
For a better discussion of the results, in Table 8 we summarized signs and significancy of the risk capacity's variables with regard to the three dimensions of asset allocation proposals so far analysed: the cash ratio, the risky portfolio's risk and the overall portfolio's risk. We begin the discussion with the four variables that are never significant.
The neglecting of wealth (either financial wealth or real estate wealth) is consistent with the classic prediction of portfolio theory suggesting that, if the utility function is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion, the portfolio risk should be independent of the level of wealth (Gollier 2001) . However, according to anecdotical evidence, the advisors state there is a direct link between the present and potential wealth and the risk capacity: in fact a wealthy investor can be less damaged by the same per cent loss which could cause another investor a serious trouble. The empirical studies show that the portfolio shares of risky assets are larger for richer than for the poorer households (Carrol 2001) : anyway a more in depth analysis shows that the relationship tends to disappear when other factors are controlled for (Guiso et al. 2001) . Our result could be interpreted also following the two well known results of behavioural finance: the habit of valuing changes rather than the states and the near-proportionality towards risk. According to prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , people value changes respect to a reference point, rather than states of wealth: so in making portfolio choice the risk tolerance, the goals and constraints could play a more relevant role than the initial wealth. The near-proportionality towards risk (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993) states that people value almost in a similar way large and small investments.
The neglecting of investor's borrowing claims for a firm criticism. We see advisors dealing with the asset side of investor's balance sheet (the wealth to be invested) and neglecting their liability side (the financial borrowing). The presence of debt introduces a leverage effect in portfolio investment and, like when buying a financial future, the impact of market volatility on gains and losses is amplified. Probably most investors are not aware of this, but the advisors should be and, as a consequence, suggest more caution in taking risks. This inconsistency finds an effective explanation in the mental accounting's rule (Thaler 1985 and 1990 ) that argues that individuals group their assets into a number of non-fungible mental accounts.
The lack of significance of the time horizon variable is against the principle of time diversification, stating that more risk tolerant investor should increase the short term risk because many risks are decreasing in the long run (Barberis 2000) . This result is consistent with the typical hypotheses of serial independence of the returns and constant risk aversion (Samuelson 1969 and 1994 ), but it is somewhat puzzling because there is a wide anecdotical evidence that professionals believe in the principle (Fisher and Statman 1999) .
As regards to the significant variables, it is noteworthy that only the family composition, through the two variables "single vs. couple" and "number of children", has got an impact on all the stages of our analysis. More precisely, advisors suggest a lowest cash ratio to couples meaning that couples are suggested a higher overall risk. On the other hand the number of children influences directly the selection of the risky asset classes. On the whole we think the impact on the overall portfolio makes sense: a couple can better afford the risks, while the children introduce a constraint that should suggest more prudence.
The negative impact of saving on overall portfolio risk seems more difficult to justify.
Usually the advisors state that saving can be seen as a sort of buffer against the real and financial risks, hedging the effects of losses. Following this reasoning, the advisor should suggest a higher saver to take more risk, that is the sign should be positive. On the other hand, the life cycle theory of the consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954) states that people plan their saving considering their life-time resources. The saving increases when a temporary increase of the income occurs and therefore it would not make sense taking more financial risk simply because the saving is increasing: therefore the current saving should not be significant. The negative sign could be explained assuming that saving is driven mainly by investor's goals and constraints, which are widely described in the information given to the advisors: the investors want to buy a house within some years, to invest more money in their professional activity, to help their children and so on. The more their goals are financial demanding, the more the investors are urged to save to meet them:
since we couldn't use in econometric analysis such goals and constraints we see only their indirect effects on saving. The joint analysis of findings about the cash ratio and the risky portfolio supports this hypothesis: saving is positively related to the cash ratio, but there is no link with the risk of risky portfolio. Therefore the negative impact on the overall risk is due to the liquidity constraints imposed to the investment policy rather than to a deliberate choice to pick safer asset classes. This explanation is consistent with the results about income which is negatively linked to the cash ratio:
everything else equal, it is quite straightforward to suggest to hold less liquidity to investors with higher salary. At the same time one should agree that in deciding the cash ratio, saving is more important than income, and in fact we found a weaker effect of the income which therefore is not able to significantly influence the risk of overall portfolio.
The diversification behavior among asset classes
Our asset allocation advice, generally consisting of mutual fund shares, offers an empirical example of style investing by advisors. Style investing is defined as an investment process where investors allocate money among styles, or asset classes, rather than among individual securities. It is widely recognized that style investing is influenced by the historical performance of asset classes, with flows of funds from the less performing classes towards the better ones (Barberis and Shleifer 2003) . We want to study the relationship between the investor's profile and the variety of style investing proposed by advisors, that is the diversification behavior among asset classes.
Our dataset can't enable us to answer the question whether advisors correctly use actual correlations in their valuation: the issue is more general as our aim is to analyze the awareness degree about the importance of correlations on the investment process.
The diversification behavior among asset classes can't be directly compared to that one at the individual securities level. While an investor holding one security is by no means diversifying, an investor with a single fund could be more diversifing than one holding two funds.
Notwithstanding there are research questions that can be common to both investment processes.
More precisely, we are interested in understanding whether or not the diversification behavior is driven by the portfolio theory principle which imposes to look at correlations among assets. This is an interesting point since experimental researches found out that individuals overlook correlations (Kroll et al. 1988) or apply the naïve diversification heuristic which leads to equally split their money among available investment alternatives (Benartzi and Thaler 2001) . While these studies concern the behavior of private investors, there is evidence that professionals could overlook correlations as well: Siebenmorgen and Weber (2003) have shown that well educated employees of a German bank set all correlations to one when making their proposals.
Our study allows to look at the behavior of professionals from an empirical perspective, moreover using a sample richer and more representative than the 23 people of the Siebenmorgen and Weber's study. To pursue our objective we have calculated two measures of diversification among asset classes: the first one is the Herfindhal's index which captures the diversification behavior without taking into account the correlations. The index is defined in the following way: We think the joint interpretation of the relationship between each index and the investor profile can shed light on the drivers of diversification behavior of advisors. If we find that the relationship with the Herfindhal's index is significant, while that one with the Diversification benefit is not, we should think that advisors decide to concentrate more or less the asset weights according to the investor profile, without taking into account asset correlations, that is they pursue mainly a naïve diversification strategy. On the contrary, if we find that the relationship with the diversification benefit is significant while that one with the Herfindhal's index is not, we could state that advisors don't simply split funds among asset classes, but they do it looking at the correlations: our data support the latter hypothesis. In tables 9 and 10 we can see that:
-the diversification benefit is always tightly and negatively linked only to risk tolerance, while others variables are far from being significant; -the results concerning the Herfindhal's index are more mixed. When the time horizon is clearly elicited, the only significant variable is financial wealth, whose relationship is negative: the less wealthy investors get relatively more concentrated proposals. When the time horizon is not elicited there is still a negative relation with the wealth, even if in the form of a real estate wealth rather than a financial one. Moreover there is negative, although less strong than in the diversification benefit case, relationship with risk tolerance.
The home bias
The overweight of the domestic stocks, known as home bias (French and Poterba 1991) , is a widespread and well recognized anomaly in the asset allocation process. Fisher and Statman (1997) have found it affects also the investment advice given by mutual fund companies. Not surprisingly we have found that as concerns the foreign advisors in our dataset the home bias is marginal (9.75%), while it is more frequent, even not dominant, among the Italian advisors (37.41%) (see Table 11 ). Since we can't state that home bias is a specific feature of the Italian advisors, we must conclude that it is the product of the nationality sharing between the advisor and the investor.
There could be three main reasons underlying the home bias of the Italian advisors in our dataset: from the supply side point of view, probably the advisors working for the Italian investment companies overweight the Italian stocks because their companies offer mainly domestic products.
The other two reasons concern the familiarity (Huberman 2001): the advisors, and the investors even more, are more familiar with the domestic markets (Coval and Moskowitz 1999) and therefore they perceive them as more predictable and less risky (Kilka and Weber 2000).
With our dataset we can verify only the explanations based on the incorrect belief that the domestic market is less risky. For this purpose we picked up the cases where the advisors exhibited home bias and we regressed the investor's features on the "home bias ratio", which is defined as the amount invested in Italian stock over the total amount invested in stock. Since in this case we haven't got many observations compared to the number of regressors, we followed a stepwise procedure to specify a more parsimonious model (see Table 12 ).
We must interpret the results taking into consideration that the home bias is a choice of under diversification and therefore of higher risk. We could rationally justify a positive relationship between risk tolerance and home bias: if the advisor believes that the domestic market has better perspective risk adjusted returns he could suggest to more risk tolerant investors to overweight more heavily the domestic market. However we don't find a relationship with the risk tolerance while there is strong one with the age (positive) and the income (negative): in other words older and lowincome investors are the preferred targets of more home biased proposals. We can find a quite straightforward explanation relying on behavioral theories: probably older people perceive domestic markets as more familiar and less risky, due to a less confident attitude towards financial markets.
Moreover the confidence towards financial risk is generally positively linked also to education, which is not part of our dataset but it could be proxied by the labor income. Therefore we could say that advisors suggest more home bias to less confident investor, who are usually older and less educated people. In such a case advisors would be rationally pursuing an irrational behavior, because they would be consciously riding the cognitive limits of their clients. It's important to remark the irrelevance of risk tolerance, demonstrating that advisors don't simply suggest home bias to less risk tolerant investors: in our opinion this is a further evidence of the self-consciousness of being acting irrationally. If this would be the case, we should infer that the advisors are renouncing to help the investors in correcting their biased or inconsistent behaviors, contradicting the professed mission of the investor advisory.
Conclusion
Our study allows to understand how highly trained financial advisors perform the task to issue tailor made asset allocation proposals for individual investors. During the investment process the advisors take into account several information given by the investors: anyway, most information are used only to define the cash ratio, that is the proportion invested in cash. The asset allocation of the risky portion of the portfolio (bonds and stocks) is driven mainly by the risk tolerance. As a result, the overall portfolio risk depends mainly on risk tolerance which, being a psychological construct, is unobservable: this approach to asset allocation must be taken carefully, because without a valid and reliable assessment of the risk tolerance it can bring to misleading choices.
We found evidence that advisors don't follow the normative models such as CAPM.
Advisors applying the behavioral models instead of the normative ones are not necessarily making a bad service to their clients. However we identified some practices that are clearly wrong and could be dangerous for the client's welfare. It is the case of the investor's debt neglecting and the home bias. It is not surprising that some advisors are prone to home bias, since it is a generally widespread anomaly: but we raise criticism on the relationship between the home bias and the investor's profile. It comes out that older and low-income investors are the preferred targets of more home biased proposals: even though this relationship can be explained by behavioral theories, we think it is inconsistent with the view of investor advisory as a prescriptive activity which must help investors to overcome their cognitive biases. Prob > F = 0.3166 * = at 10% of significance level ** = at 5% of significance level *** = at 1% of significance level 
